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1 Introduction  
When there has been a heavy fall of rain on a newly made and newly  
grassed football field, you do not chase two football teams on to it to play  
a match.  
These homely but profound remarks were addressed to our small delegation during 
1994 when we were visiting Hungary to study its recently adopted new Constitution 
and its young Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Constitution and its Constitutional 
Court were then but five years old.  The remarks were made by the leader of the 
opposition in the Hungarian national legislature.  This wise, seasoned political 
campaigner had been criticising some of the recent judgments of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court and his remarks were intended to impress on us that, whatever 
his criticisms might be, he had a deep commitment to the new constitutional state and 
its independent institutions and that the latter should never be harmed for the sake of 
political or other gain.  Our own Constitution, and the constitutional democracy it 
guarantees, is also a newly planted field, little more than five years old.  
In this paper I propose noting first some of the features of modern constitutionalism 
and the paradoxes to which they give rise. I then discuss the need for independent 
constitutional institutions, the substantive independence necessary for their proper 
functioning and areas where they require special support.  I conclude with some 
observations on the paradox of judicial review, appropriate checks and balances on 
courts exercising judicial review and the vital importance of distinguishing between 
honest and informed criticism of judgments and judges and the undermining of the 
judiciary as a constitutional institution.  
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2 Constitutionalism  
"Constitutional democracy" connotes a development in the concept of democracy 
which began towards the end of the eighteenth century but which has gained more 
universal recognition only in the last 50 years.  On the one hand, constitutional 
democracy recognises the ancient democratic principle that government of a country 
is based on and legitimated by the will and consent of the governed (or more 
accurately the will and consent of the majority of the governed), which is determined 
by regular multi-party elections based on universal adult franchise.  On the other 
hand, constitutional democracy limits this principle by making the democratically 
elected government and the will of the majority subject to a written constitution and 
the norms embodied in it, which constitution is enshrined as the supreme law of the 
country in question. An almost universal feature of modern constitutionalism is a Bill 
of Rights which forms part of the Constitution and which is designed to protect and 
enforce individual rights principally, although not exclusively, against the state. The 
concept of a constitutional democracy, for which the short-hand expression 
"constitutionalism" is sometimes used, is a radical one, the full implications of which 
are not always readily appreciated.  It transforms the regulation of the state and 
those living in it from a political exercise which in principle can be, and in practice 
sometimes is, value free and dictated by the majority, to one which is shaped and 
ruled, both directly and indirectly, by the Constitution and its underlying norms and 
values. In a constitutional state, the politics of governance can never again be a 
merely pragmatic enterprise aimed exclusively at achieving the various goals 
comprising the government's electoral mandate.  Governance is now subject to the 
Constitution and its values.  
Constitutionalism also embodies the principle of the separation of powers but, in 
consequence of the bitter lessons of constitutional history, has come to accept the 
vital need to impose checks and balances on the three arms of the state. Modern 
constitutionalism has moved strongly away from Plato, who saw the fundamental 
problem of politics in the question: "Who shall rule the state?"  Instead it asks the 
new and different question:  "How can we so organise political institutions that bad or 
incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage."
1
 This is not an 
expression of cynicism, but of wisdom gained from the painful lessons of human 
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fallibility and particularly from the attendant fact that no-one can be completely trusted 
with power and its subtle temptations.  A competent and independent judiciary, with 
the power to review all legislative and executive action which is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, is regarded, almost universally, as the prime and most effective check 
on the legislative and executive arms of the state. More recently, however, it has 
come to be realised that for the truly effective and meaningful operation of 
constitutionalism other independent state institutions are necessary. The collective 
objective of these institutions is to ensure that the Constitution in fact produces what it 
proclaims; that constitutionalism becomes a way of life in all institutional structures.  
An invariable consequence of constitutionalism is the tension between the will of the 
majority, and its representatives, on the one hand, and the normative control of the 
Constitution, exercised through the courts and other institutions, on the other.  This 
tension, one might even call it a paradox, cannot ever be completely or permanently 
resolved, an inevitability which is, as yet, inadequately appreciated and I will touch on 
it later in this paper.  
3  The Need for Independent Institutions  
The South African Constitution has clearly designated the judiciary as the prime 
upholder and enforcer of the Constitution. While prescribing certain constitutional 
functions for all courts, the Constitution has conferred a special role in this regard on 
the Constitutional Court. There are particular historical and fundamental 
jurisprudential reasons for this which fall outside the ambit of this paper. Apart from 
those matters in respect of which it has exclusive jurisdiction,
2
 the Constitutional 
Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters,
3 
which includes issues  
1 See Popper Open Society 120-121.  
2 2 Enumerated in s 167(4).  
3 3 S 167(3)(a) of the 1996 Constitution ("the Constitution").  
LWH Ackermann  PER/PELJ 2000(3)1 
 
5/120 
 
connected with a decision on a constitutional matter;
4 
decisions on whether a matter 
is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is connected with a decision on a 
constitutional matter;
5 
and any issue involving the interpretation, protection or 
enforcement of the Constitution.
6
  In fact the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is 
even more extensive than the above might superficially suggest, because it also 
includes the final decision whether, in interpreting any legislation and developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum has correctly 
"promote[d] the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
7  
 
The Constitution has, however, gone further in its commitment to strengthening and 
entrenching constitutionalism and, drawing on the often sad experiences of young 
democracies in the past, wisely makes provision for a variety of independent state 
institutions whose purpose is to "strengthen constitutional democracy in the 
Republic".
8 
They are the Public Protector;  the Human Rights Commission;  the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities;  the Gender Commission;  the Auditor-General and the 
Electoral Commission.  Apart from these state institutions the Constitution also 
makes provision for other independent bodies designed to play an important checking 
and balancing role.  So, for example, in relation to local government, it mandates the 
establishment of an independent authority for the determination of municipal 
boundaries,
9
 provides for a Financial and Fiscal Commission which is independent, 
impartial and subject only to the Constitution and the law
10
 and a Reserve Bank which 
must perform its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice.
11  
 
One may legitimately ask why it is necessary to make provision for these additional 
independent institutions.  The object is clearly stated by the Constitution in relation to 
the independent state institutions referred to in section 181 and is to be inferred for 
the others, namely, to strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic.  From a  
4 S 167(3)(b) and (c).  
5 S 167 (3)(c).  
6 S 167(7).  
7 S 39(2) read with ss 173 and 167(7).  
8 S 181(1).  
9 S 155(3)(b).  
10 S 220.  
11 S 224(2).  
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functional point of view this purpose, once stated, strikes one as obvious.  Yet it is a 
truism not always appreciated.  The remarkable success of our 1994 and 1999 
elections, in the sense that they were substantially free and fair and were accepted as 
legitimate by the overwhelming majority of the electorate across all political 
boundaries, can only be ascribed to the  competent functioning of the Electoral 
Commission, whose independence has been guaranteed by both the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions and which was jealously asserted by the Electoral Commission itself. 
We tend to take this for granted, forgetting in the process how many emerging 
democracies have stumbled at the hurdle of their first elections, because the results 
are not accepted as true or legitimate by a suspicious and newly liberated electorate. 
In my view the significance of these institutions goes even deeper.  A homely 
metaphor has on occasion been used to describe the Constitution as comprising the 
building blocks for a constitutional democracy, but it warns that they need a pervading 
human rights ethos to act as the mortar binding these blocks securely together;  
without such mortar, the structure will remain unstable and liable to topple in severe 
political storms.  The proper functioning of the independent constitutional institutions, 
including the court system, is vitally important for creating and sustaining such an 
ethos of constitutionalism amongst the inhabitants of the Republic. The regular 
effective functioning of these institutions assists in establishing the habits of 
constitutionalism.  It advances constitutionalism from an exercise of the mind to a 
living practice, even a ritual if you will.  Practices and rituals in the life of a nation, as 
well as in that of an individual, are important. When a nation is seriously shaken by 
the storms of political life, the demands of the moment can place principle under 
threat. At such times the ingrained and almost instinctual habits and rituals of 
constitutionalism may be the last line of defence for the Constitution. The inculcation 
of these practices and habits are therefore of great importance. It is similarly 
important to resists all attempts to undermine these institutions and the habits of 
constitutionalism.  
4 Substantive Independence of these Institutions  
In relation to the judiciary and the other independent state institutions to which 
reference has been made, the Constitution makes explicit provision for their 
protection and thereby indirectly for the development of these habits of 
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constitutionalism.  The independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
courts are protected both by negative and positive injunctions in the Constitution.
12 
The courts are stated to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law; no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts; and 
organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness.
13
 Likewise the independent state institutions mentioned are declared by 
the Constitution to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law; 
other organs of state are obliged by the Constitution, through legislative and other 
measures, to protect them and to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness, and no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
these institutions.
14
 The protection and support given to these institutions by the 
Constitution, is very similar to that given to the courts.  One important distinction is to 
be noted.  In the case of the courts the Constitution provides that they "are subject 
only to the Constitution and the law" and no provision is made for them to be 
accountable to any other organ of state or any other institution or person for that 
matter.  If the term accountability is applicable at all to the courts, about which I have 
substantial reservations, then courts are "accountable" only to the Constitution and 
the law, both directly through the Constitution and indirectly through the judicial oath 
of office.  A judge (that is to say a judicial officer on the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Courts and the courts of a similar status to the 
High Courts) may only be removed from office if such judge "suffers from an 
incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct", has been found as 
a fact to fall into one or more of those categories by the Judicial Services Commission 
and a resolution of the National Assembly adopted with a supporting vote of at least 
two thirds of its members has called for such judge's removal.  Provided, therefore, 
that a judge does not suffer from incapacity, is not grossly incompetent and is not 
guilty of gross misconduct, she or he is not accountable to any organ of state.  By 
contrast, the independent institutions envisaged in section 181 are expressly made 
accountable to the National Assembly and are obliged to report on their activities and  
12 See s 165(2), (3) and (4).  
13 13 Id.  
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the performance of their functions to the Assembly at least once a year.
15  
 
The independence of state institutions falling outside the legislature and the executive 
is particularly vulnerable in the area of fiscal and bureaucratic control.  While their 
formal independence may at all times be scrupulously recognised by the legislature 
and the executive, their substantive independence can easily be undermined by fiscal 
starvation and their ability to function properly impeded by bureaucratic administrative 
obstruction or obfuscation or even, quite innocently, by a lack of appreciation of what 
the Constitution demands from public administration in support of these institutions.  
If the institutions I am discussing are to function truly independently and to fulfil 
properly the significant roles assigned to them by the Constitution, safeguards must 
be devised and implemented in these areas.  While certain mechanisms may assist, 
acceptable independence will only be permanently achieved, I believe, if the right 
constitutional habits are developed by the organs of state and all citizens come to 
realise the importance of their own watch-dog functions.  
 
Substantive independence of the courts as required by the Constitution implies much, 
but chiefly it connotes three things.  Firstly, the training and ethical fibre of judges 
must be such that they can and will be beholden only to the Constitution and its 
values in performing their judicial duties and not be influenced by other considerations 
and pressures.  Secondly, the judiciary must enjoy reasonable financial security and 
adequate working conditions in order to attract candidates to judicial office with the 
requisite training and ethical fibre and also in order to remove the need and 
temptation, once they are appointed, to look elsewhere in order to maintain an 
adequate standard of living and in so doing risk sacrificing their independence. 
Thirdly, their independence must be effectively protected by the Constitution so that 
no-one, whether within or outside state structures, is able to interfere improperly with 
the discharge of their duties. In order for all these aspects of judicial independence to 
be achieved, the courts require adequate financial and administrative resources.  
Crucial in this regard is that  
 
14 S 181(2) - (4).  
15 S 181(5).  
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the process whereby these resources are supplied and controlled should reinforce the 
independence of the courts and not undermine it.  In pursuance of its obligations 
under section 165(4) of the Constitution,
16
 Parliament has, for example, enacted the 
Constitutional Court Complementary Act ("the CC Complementary Act"). Apart from 
other measures designed to assist the Constitutional Court and to strengthen its 
independence and effectiveness, the CC Complementary Act provides, most 
commendably, in section 15:  
(1) Expenditure in connection with the administration and functioning of the 
Court shall be defrayed from monies appropriated by Parliament.    
(2) Requests for the funds needed for the administration and functioning of the  
Court, as determined by the President of the Court after consultation with 
the Minister, shall be addressed to Parliament by the Minister in the manner 
prescribed for the budgetary processes of departments of state.  
 
Two significant points are to be noted. The first is that the funds needed for the 
administration and functioning of the Constitutional Court are determined by the 
President of the Court and by no-one else.  While the President of the Court has to 
consult with the Minister he is not bound by the views expressed by the Minister, nor 
is he obliged to obtain the approval or consent of the Minister.  Secondly the Minister 
is obliged to address to Parliament a request for such funds as so determined by the 
President in the above manner.  Accordingly, the funding for the administration and 
functioning of the Constitutional Court is not merely a line item in the budget of the 
Department of Justice in regard to which the Court might make recommendations 
only, but would have little control over what is submitted to Parliament.  In this way 
Parliament has gone a long way to securing the independence of the Constitutional 
Court in regard to its financial needs.  The question which arises is whether similar 
provision ought not to be made in regard to the rest of the judiciary.    
16  Which obliges all organs of state, through legislative and other measures to "assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts."  
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Quite clearly Parliament must, even in a constitutional state, control the budgetary 
processes and expenditure of departments of state and also of the judicial arm of the 
state. As far as the latter is concerned, this is a sensitive area in the terrain of the 
separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary which requires the 
greatest circumspection and regard for comity between them.  The Constitutional 
Court must not intrude, or be seen to intrude on the fiscal and financial powers of 
Parliament.
17 
At the same time Parliament must execute these powers in conformity 
with all its obligations under the Constitution and not in a way which will harm the 
independence of the judiciary.  The same is true of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive in regard to the administration and functioning of the 
courts. In areas where the contours of these relationships are not spelt out in 
legislation, and perhaps cannot easily be spelt out, there is need for sound habits and 
practices of constitutionalism to develop as soon as possible.  
5  Where These Institutions Need Particular Support  
For a number of reasons it has been difficult for these habits and practices to 
develop. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the transition to a constitutional 
democracy is proving to be slower, more complex and more difficult than initially 
contemplated and that the coming into operation of the 1996 Constitution did not 
complete this final stage, it merely introduced it.  While this may be a sobering 
thought, it also reminds us of how thankful we ought to be for the great deal which 
has already been achieved with relatively little bloodshed and it focuses our attention 
on the importance of what still has to be done.  The process of changing from a 
racist oligarchy to a constitutional democracy has presented legal, technical, logistic 
and resource problems which would have been daunting for a country with financial 
and other resources many times greater than South Africa's.  The extent to which 
and the complexity with which institutionalised apartheid had invaded the legal fabric 
of society has been underestimated.  When the interim Constitution, as it was 
obliged to do, at one and the same time imploded the existing provincial and local 
government structures and replaced them with structures which could only take effect  
17 For example under chapter 13 of the Constitution.  
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incrementally, it made technical legal demands on the legislatures and their technical 
draftspersons which bordered on the impossible.  Provincial governments, which 
have instruments on their statute books which are clearly inconsistent with the 
Constitution or are obliged to administer such instruments, have to tread extremely 
warily before discarding such instruments and must make certain that it is within their 
legislative competence to do so.  Under the Bill of Rights, for example, everyone has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law
18
 under circumstances where 
equality "includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms"
19
 and there 
is an obligation on the government to promote the achievement of equality,
20
 which 
obligation the government is constitutionally mandated to discharge diligently and 
without delay.
21
  Any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution became invalid, 
at the latest, when the 1996 Constitution came into effect.
22
  There is an obligation 
on government to ensure that such invalidity does not leave a lacuna in the law, 
which in turn commits government to a massive remedial legislative programme.  For 
the first time in the history of this country the legislatures and executives at all levels 
of government, represent all the people democratically and are constitutionally 
equally committed to all the people.  The pressures on them, particularly in the 
national sphere, are enormous.  Nevertheless, all South Africans must still be vigilant 
to ensure, from the outset, that all state organs develop these habits and practices of 
constitutionalism and that they do not, whether by omission, error or otherwise 
endanger the independence of our independent state institutions by neglecting their 
constitutional obligations under section 181(3) "through legislative and other 
measures [to] assist and protect these institutions to ensure [their] independence, 
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness."  
How easily these obligations can come to be neglected is illustrated by the 
Constitutional Court's judgment in the New National Party Bar Code case
23
 which 
dealt amongst other things with the independence of the Electoral Commission ("the 
Commission").  The Court's judgment points out that, where necessary,   
18  S 9(1) of the Constitution.  
19  S 9(2).  
20  S 9(2).  
21  S 237.  
22  See the supremacy clauses, s 4(1) of the interim Constitution and s 2 of the 1996 Constitution; 
see also Ferreira v Levin;  Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) par [27-30].  
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… old legislative and policy arrangements, public administration practices 
and budgetary conventions must be adjusted to be brought in line with the 
new constitutional prescripts.
24 
 
The Departments of Home Affairs and State Expenditure were found to have acted in 
a way which constituted a serious slight to the dignity and integrity of the 
Commission
25
 and that the Department of State Expenditure and the Minister of 
Finance had failed to appreciate the true import of the requirements of the 
Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act regarding the independence of the 
Commission and that the Commission was accountable to the National Assembly and 
not the executive.
26
 The Court emphasised the importance of both financial and 
administrative independence:  
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between two factors, both of which ... 
are relevant to "independence". The first is "financial independence". This 
implies the ability to have access to funds reasonably required to enable 
the Commission to discharge the functions it is obliged to perform under the 
Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act.  This does not mean that it 
can set its own budget. Parliament does that.  What it does mean, 
however, is that Parliament must consider what is reasonably required by 
the Commission and deal with requests for funding rationally, in the light of 
other national interests. It is for Parliament, and not the executive arm of 
government, to provide for funding reasonably sufficient to enable the 
Commission to carry out its constitutional mandate. The Commission must 
accordingly be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend its budgetary 
requirements before Parliament or its relevant committees.  
The second factor, "administrative independence", implies that there will  
23  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC).  
24  Id par 78.  
25  Id par 85.  
26  Id par 100.  
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be control [by the Commission] over those matters directly connected with 
the functions which the Commission has to perform under the Constitution 
and the Act. ... The department cannot tell the Commission how to conduct 
the registration, whom to employ, and so on; but if the Commission asks 
the government for assistance to provide personnel to take part in the 
registration process, government must provide such assistance if it is able 
to do so.  If not, the Commission must be put in funds to enable it to what 
is necessary.
27 
(Emphasis supplied)  
These are general principles applicable to the independence and function of all 
independent institutions.  
6  The Paradox of Judicial Review and Appropriate Checks and Balances  
The tension or paradox which constitutionalism creates manifests itself most sharply 
in the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the other two arms of the 
state at national level, because it is the Constitutional Court which, in the final 
instance determines whether the actions of the legislature and the executive are 
consistent with the Constitution and, if not, invalidates them.  For the Constitutional 
Court, in this context, to fulfil its role as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution it 
must be independent, not only of these organs of state, but also of the political 
majority.  Its members cannot be elected, because that would imply that the Court 
owed an allegiance or accountability to the political majority or other elector in 
question.  On the other hand, it is seen as undemocratic for a body which is not 
elected to be in a position to overrule the expressed will of the political 
representatives of the majority.  This paradox, although particularly striking in the 
case of the Constitutional Court, exists in respect of all our courts and makes the 
method of appointing judicial officers particularly important in order to ensure at the 
same time, and as far as this is practically possible, both their independence and their 
legitimacy.  This brings me to the point I want to stress particularly.  The judiciary is 
not, and ought not to be seen as, an arm of the state which has been exempted from 
all  
27 Id pars 98-99.  
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checks and balances.  At the same time it is important, particularly so for the general 
public, to appreciate that the checks and balances on the judiciary are not the same 
as in the case of the legislature and the executive.  In the case of the latter the 
checks and balances are principally through the Constitution, as enforced by the 
courts, and through the political process.  In the case of the courts these checks and 
balances cannot be through the political process, for this would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary, which in turn would seriously undermine the judiciary's 
crucial function of being a check on the legislature and executive.  It is therefore 
unfortunate that the expression "accountability" has been used in relation to the 
judiciary, for it suggests, wrongly and misleadingly, that the checks and balances on 
the judiciary are political in nature.  
At the same time I should like to stress, as clearly as I can, that the judiciary is not, 
and does not regard itself as being, above the Constitution or exempt from checks 
and balances.  It must at the same time be appreciated that the checks and balances 
on the judiciary are different and in most cases also operate indirectly.  Their main 
features seem to me to be the following:  
(a)  In the first place it is possible for the appointment process to be such that it 
ensures that persons are appointed to the judiciary who are suitably qualified, 
both intellectually and ethically, to serve the Constitution and the law;  who 
have the commitment to do so without qualification and who will accordingly 
regard their oaths of judicial office as being unconditionally binding on their 
consciences.  
(b)  Second, all courts function in the most transparent manner possible, not only in 
the conduct of their hearings but in furnishing reasons for the conclusions and 
judgments they reach.  The obligations to furnish reasons for their judgments, 
such reasons becoming more comprehensive the higher the particular court is 
in the hierarchy of courts, is probably the most powerful mechanism to ensure 
that courts operate under and within the constitution and the law. These 
reasoned judgments are public documents and open to the scrutiny of 
colleagues in all other courts, to other lawyers in all branches of the legal 
professions and to all members of the public.  They are open to criticism by 
anyone who cares to do so. There is no limit to such criticism, provided it does 
LWH Ackermann  PER/PELJ 2000(3)1 
 
15/120 
 
not misrepresent the content or conclusions of the judgment, the facts or the 
law on which it is based or wrongly ascribes dishonest or improper motives to 
the court which has delivered the judgment.  Critical rationalism is, I believe, 
the best and safest method of arriving at the truth generally, which is one of the 
reasons why freedom of expressions is such a fundamental liberty.  Critical 
rationalism is no less important in applying and developing the law and 
keeping a check on those who perform this function.  
(c)  Third, provision is made for the judgments of all courts (except those of the 
Constitutional Court and those of the Supreme Court of Appeal in matters 
which are not of a constitutional nature, in the sense already described) to be 
taken on appeal to a higher court where they can be corrected.  Courts of 
appeal have never hesitated to correct judgments, where this is warranted, nor 
to criticise judicial officers where they have acted incorrectly or behaved 
improperly.   
(d)  Fourth, in the case of the Constitutional Court in particular, from which there is 
no further appeal, the opportunity, I would even call it a constitutional duty, for 
public scrutiny and criticism becomes all-important as a safeguard. The efficacy 
of informed and rational public scrutiny and criticism, as a means of legitimately 
"checking" judicial conduct, especially of the highest courts, must not be 
underestimated, particularly not in a constitutional state which has made the 
radical shift away from the Westminster parliamentary supremacy of the past.  
On the assumption that the appointment and promotion procedures work 
adequately, the judges on the highest courts, through their training and 
experience, will have become steeped in the habits of rational analysis, 
argument, criticism and hypothesis formation.  This will have become an 
integral, I would venture to say an inseparable, part of their legal thinking. Few 
judges would confess to actually liking criticism, but the better informed and the 
more rationally structured criticism is, the less these judicial habits are able to 
resist following the arguments. Criticism which is based, whether intentionally 
or not, on a false substratum of fact or law, is counterproductive. If public 
debate is regularly premised on such false substratum, whoever might be 
responsible for supplying it, the natural tendency is to ignore such  
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debate as unreliable and in this way the  good is lost with the bad.  
(e)  Fifth, in extreme cases judges may be removed from office for incapacity, gross 
incompetence and gross misconduct in the manner already alluded to.  
(f)  Lastly, the Constitution makes provision for national legislation to provide for 
procedures for dealing with complaints about judicial officers. Such legislation 
will have to comply with the Constitution and not interfere with judicial 
independence itself. There is no reason to think that procedures cannot be 
devised which, while not harming judicial independence, can deal appropriately 
with judicial misconduct so as to be an effective check on unconstitutional 
judicial actions.  Attention is already being given to such legislation.  
 
While informed and rational criticism of the judiciary performs an important 
constitutional function, the deliberate undermining of this indispensable independent 
institution comes close to treason.  While judges are not sacrosanct, the institution 
which they serve is.  By and large, following the exemplary lead given by President 
Mandela, legislative and executive organs have, almost without exception, been 
scrupulous in their conduct towards the Constitutional Court as a constitutional 
institution. The example of President Mandela I refer to above relates to his response 
to the judgment of the Constitutional Court dealing with the provisions of section 16A 
of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 ("the LGTA") which purported to 
give the President the power to amend the LGTA by proclamation.
28
  The President, 
relying on section 16A and legal advice he had been given, purported to amend the 
LGTA by means of two proclamations.  The matter was politically sensitive and had 
potentially far-reaching implications for the holding of local government elections in 
the Cape Town metropolitan area.  The Court held that the provisions of section16A 
of the LGTA were constitutionally invalid and that the President had acted 
unconstitutionally in purporting to amend the provisions of the LGTA by proclamation 
under the authority of section 16A.  The same day on which the Court's judgment 
was delivered, President Mandela appeared on the public media.  He explained that 
he had acted in good faith and in reliance on legal advice given to him. He did not 
question  
28  Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC).  
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the correctness of the Court's decision but, more importantly, he stressed that the 
Court was the final constitutional arbiter on the constitutionality of his presidential 
actions, that the Constitution was supreme and that the Court's judgment had 
unconditionally to be followed.  
It is somewhat paradoxical that the only substantial attacks on the Constitutional 
Court, calculated to impair it as an institution, have come from political minorities who, 
one would have thought, would be particularly anxious to rely on such an institution to 
protect its individual rights against the political majority. The most significant example 
of such an attack is that referred to in the Sarfu judgments of the Constitutional 
Court.
29 
The recusal application launched by doctor Luyt against members of the 
Constitutional Court was unprecedented.  It attacked the integrity of every member of 
the Constitutional Court, "contrasting their integrity and courage (perceived to be 
flawed) with that of the Judge [in the High Court] (who was said to have shown 
remarkable courage in giving the judgment that he did)."
30
  The implication of the 
allegations against all ten members of the Court was stated in the recusal judgment to 
be  - 
... that the ten members of this Court had created the impression that they 
had already decided to uphold the appeal of the President at a time when 
the record had not been filed and before argument on behalf of any of the 
parties had been heard. Having so decided, the further consequence of this 
impression was that they made interlocutory rulings aimed at upholding the 
President's appeal.  The suggestion that a court, without having seen the 
record or heard argument, would engineer its interlocutory rulings to favour 
a decision it had already taken, is extraordinary and contemptuous.
31 
 
In the judgment on the merits the following was said of similar tactics:  
29  The President of the Republic of South Africa v The South African Rugby Football Union CCT 
16/98. The first Constitutional Court judgment (the forum judgment) is reported in 1999 (2) BCLR 
175 (CC), the second (the recusal judgment) is reported in 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC) and the third 
(the judgment on the merits) was delivered on 10 September 1999 but, as at the date of drafting 
this paper, had not yet been reported.  
30  The judgment on the merits, above n 29 at par 251.  
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The tactics adopted by Dr Luyt bear the hallmark of spin-doctoring by a 
respondent who, knowing that the appeal might succeed, lays the ground to 
discredit the Court with the object of undermining a decision which might go 
against him.  The appellants might succeed, but it would be a pyrrhic 
victory, secured by a dishonest President from a compliant Court.
32 
 
For the sake of constitutionalism, it is essential to distinguish between, on the one 
hand, honest and informed criticism of the judgments and behaviour of judges and, 
on the other, conduct calculated to undermine the judiciary as an institution.  
One of the reciprocal obligations which a constitutional democracy imposes on all its 
subjects is to support the independent constitutional institutions, as constitutional 
institutions, not only vocally at the level of intellectual abstraction, but by actively 
working to establish the habits of constitutionalism in all societal structures and 
societal interaction.  Our constitutional playing fields are well constructed and 
planted, but require careful tending.  
31 Recusal judgment, above n 29 at par 54.  
32 Judgment on the merits, above n 29 at par 255.  
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